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In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer remarks that some 
philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein have maintained 
that we cannot meaningfully attribute conscious states 
to creatures without language.! This is, as Singer 
observes, a hazy line of thought at best, but it is true that 
some philosophers occasionally maintain it. The moral 
implications of such a view are obviously disastrous for 
animals. While it is absurd to associate such an extreme 
and implausible position with Wittgenstein himself, some 
of his remarks do lend themselves to more moderate 
positions which place serious restrictions on animal 
mentality. These restrictions do have an impact, probably 
a negative one, on the moral standing of animals. I do 
not intend this paper to be a strict exegetical account of 
Wittgenstein's own views; his remarks on these issues 
are more suggestive than explicit in any case. Rather, I 
want to consider a few lines of thought in the 
Philosophical Investigations along with some of the 
appropriations of Wittgenstein by some of his followers 
on the issue of animal minds. I hope to show that their 
efforts to draw a clear line distinguishing animal and 
human mentality is misguided and that emphasis on 
psychological continuity between the species is 
evidenced in Wittgenstein's own work. 
I 
First, I would like to say something about the association 
ofWittgenstein himself with the view that animals are 
utterly mindless. Perhaps this interpretation can be 
supported by some rather cryptic remarks that 
Wittgenstein made, particularly in the Investigations. 
There he denies that we could understand a lion even if 
it could talk. He also says that it's senseless to suppose 
a dog may hope or pretend that it is in pain. In addition, 
Wittgenstein's private language argument is supposed 
to show that the ability to apply concepts meaningfully 
requires public criteria. And presumably the most 
impressive public criteria can be provided by language. 
One might conclude from this that Wittgenstein's view 
is that minds require concepts and that concepts require 
the public evidence oflanguage. Whatever might be said 
for such a position, it is clear that it is not Wittgenstein's. 
Language does make an important difference as to 
what sorts of mental states a creature might realize on 
Wittgenstein's view, but in the very passages often 
invoked to support lack of animal mentality, 
Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges that some mental 
states are possible without language: 
One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, 
unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And 
why not? 
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A dog believes his master is at the door. But 
can he also believe his master will come the 
day after tomorrow?2 
In spite of his intention to limit the sorts ofmental states 
that can be reasonably attributable to animals, 
Wittgenstein actually granted them rather a lot. His rlfst 
statement gives examples of conscious infraverbal 
mentality, since anger and happiness do not seem to be 
realizable by non-conscious entities. His last claim, 
while denying the possibility of certain kinds of canine 
beliefs, explicitly attributes intentional states to dogs 
(since even simple beliefs are intentional). So, dogs and 
other animals have some intentional states as well as 
some conscious ones. But, as intentionality and 
consciousness are apparently the primary indicators of 
mentality, it is clear enough that Wittgenstein is not 
denying the possibility of animal minds. 
It seems then that Wittgenstein is only contending 
that some mental states are possible only for creatures 
with linguistic capacity. Some beliefs, for example, are 
presumably too finely grained to be attributed 
reasonably to an infralinguistic organism. But that's 
quite different from claiming that the creature can't have 
beliefs at all. Perhaps Wittgenstein wished to deny that 
animals could have long term expectations, beliefs, or 
desires. But even this much is not obvious. Wittgenstein 
concentrates on certain examples which are supposed 
to illustrate the sort of difference that language makes 
for mind. But so far as I can tell, he makes no general 
claim like: "Animals can have present or short-term 
cognitive states, whereas long term intentional states 
require language." The reason I think Wittgenstein 
avoids such generalizations is that they seem to be 
subject to empirical falsification-perhaps non-
linguistic evidence ofa long-term expectation could be 
given. It's hard to say in a clear and general way just 
what it is that animals cannot, in principle, do, on 
Wittgenstein's view. This is why he concentrates on 
specific examples of certain mental states which are 
supposed to be dependent on language in various ways. 
But even some of the limited examples he provides can 
be called into question, as tlley have been recently by 
Bernard Rollin: 
As to Wittgenstein's claims that an animal 
can't hope or simulate pain, these are truly 
perplexing. What else can one say of a dog 
when it sits at attention while you are eating 
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but that it is hoping you will give it a scrap? 
As to simulating pain, any pet-owner and any 
veterinarian can relate cases in which animals 
simulated pain in order to get attention, avoid 
punishment, and so on, especially if they have 
been fussed over in the past when they had 
an injury.3 
Perhaps Wittgenstein should have used other examples. 
But in any case, it's clear enough by now that his 
contention that some mental states are language-
dependent is not a claim about mental states generally. 
Still, some may remain unconvinced. After all, 
Wittgenstein also made the startling claim that if a lion 
could talk, we could not understand him. This might be 
taken to mean that our lives are just different in kind 
from lions and other animals, and a part of the difference 
is the fact that we, and not they, are language users. 
Here again, Rollin points out that there might indeed 
be a great deal that a human and a lion might have to 
talk about. And granting that there is much that we 
would not have in common with this lion, we can readily 
think ofhuman beings whose forms oflife are similarly 
unfamiliar to us (Rollin mentions accountants and 
fundamentalists, but there are others): we can 
understand them as well, or as badly, as we can 
Wiugenstein's talking lion! But even if that is wrong, 
the alleged difference, on Wiugenstein's account, 
between a lion and a human is emphatically not the 
difference of linguistic capacity. Indeed, the example 
obliterates that distinction. Instead, the issue is whether 
or not there are enough shared features of life in order 
to make linguistic communication possible. The reason 
we can't understand a lion is not that we and only we 
have concepts, because we and only we use language. 
The intelligibility of linguistic utterance is dependent 
upon other features of a shared life. I think that Rollin is 
right. Wittgenstein has indeed overlooked those features 
of life that are shared between lions and humans in order 
to make his point about the intelligibility of language. 
But even if Rollin were wrong, the example does not 
endorse attributing lack of conceptuality or mentality to 
lions or other infraverbal organisms-quite the contrary. 
Perhaps Wittgenstein's view with respect to the 
possibility of animal mental life is most apparent if one 
considers the simple state of being in pain. In the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein says that in teaching 
someone to say "I am in pain," we are teaching that 
person a new pain behavior. Clearly, the ability to say 
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those words is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for being in pain. Indeed, the words have 
the sense that they have for us only in the context of 
other natural pain behavior----(;rying, moaning, etc. 
Such linguistic practices acquire their significance 
from non-linguistic ones. Patricia Hanna argued the 
point as follows: 
Imagine a group of people who occasionally 
utter the words "I'm in pain," but who never 
exhibit any natural pain behavior; they would 
be an enigma to us. We could not treat their 
use of the words "I'm in pain" as meaning what 
they would mean if used by us; but what other 
sense might we ascribe to them?4 
Pain behavior can take both linguistic and pre-linguistic 
forms, but Hanna's very Wittgensteinian point is that 
linguistic expressions of pain states are intelligible only 
in the context of their non-linguistic surroundings. But 
in this case the non-linguistic surroundings (Le., the 
crying, moaning, etc.) already presuppose a conscious 
mental life. I think Wittgenstein holds a similar position 
with respect to mind and language generally. Consider 
his remarks concerning the Cartesian claim that animals 
cannot think: 
It is sometimes said that animals do not talk 
because they lack the mental capacity. And this 
means: "They do not think, and that is why 
they do not talk." But-they simply do not 
talk. Or to put it better: they do not use 
language-if we except the most primitive 
forms of language.-Commanding, ques-
tioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a 
part of our natural history as walking, eating, 
drinking, playing.5 
II 
While Wittgenstein does not draw the line between 
human and animal minds as sharply as some suppose, 
it is still clear enough that he does intend to draw a line 
somewhere. But where and how? Wittgenstein's 
student, Norman Malcolm, suggests a way of drawing 
the linguistic line between humans and animals that 
perhaps elucidates Wittgenstein's own view. 
Malcolm considers a scenario where a dog is chasing 
the neighbor's cat. The cat runs toward an oak tree but 
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at the last moment veers off to a maple tree nearby. The 
dog runs up to the oak, looks up into its branches, and 
barks excitedly. If we observe this, Malcolm says, we 
will want to say, "He thinks the cat went up that oak 
tree." And to maintain with Descartes that animals do 
not think would be an error. Nevertheless, Malcolm does 
not want to credit the dog with having the mistaken 
thought, "the cat is up this tree." 
Malcolm's contention is not so much that it is 
impossible for dogs or other animals to have thoughts. 
The question is, what are the grounds for attributing 
thoughts. As Malcolm puts the point, it is not a question 
about whether or not a dog might have thoughts but, 
rather, whether or not it can express thoughts. The 
expression of the thought, "the cat is up the oak tree," 
like the expression of any thought, requires language, 
according to Malcolm. A dog, or a human being for 
that matter, might well behave as if she was having a 
certain thought. These are cases of "thinking that p." 
To have the thought-"that p" is a linguistically 
dependentact. Indeed, on Malcolm's view, "the relation 
between thought and language must be so close that it 
is really senseless to conjecture that people may not 
have thoughts, and also really senseless to conjecture 
that animals may have thoughts."6 
Malcolm's argument preserves the Wittgensteinian 
intuition that language makes a crucial difference in 
mental capacity while making a case against the 
Cartesian denial of all mental states to animals. 
Descartes' mistake, according to Malcolm, was that he 
didn't grasp the distinction between having thoughts 
and mere thinking. Animals may be credited, on this 
view, with a wide range of intentional and conscious 
states: they can feel, be angry, believe, fear, etc., but 
they cannot have thoughts. 
Malcolm's position is not without its difficulties, 
however. Since Malcolm will not say what "thoughts" 
are in general (he doesn't think that there's sensible 
answer to that question), it's hard to get clear on just 
why they cannot be sensibly attributed to animals. 
Indeed, as Donald Weiss has shown, it's easy to 
construct a counter-example to the contention that 
thought requires language.? Weiss describes a fictional 
languageless character, named Arthur, who engages in 
a range of sophisticated intentional behavior that is 
clearly best described not only in terms of thinking but 
also of having thoughts. The moral of the story seems 
to be that there just is no non-question-begging way to 
exclude non-linguistic evidence for thought (after all, 
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consider the case of human mutes!) Some may (and 
have) resisted the fictional character ofWeiss' example. 
Nevertheless, many ordinary cases of animal behavior 
seem to require explication in terms of thoughts, not 
just thinking. Gareth Matthews describes one such case 
of a well-known ape: 
...Sultan...was given two hollow sticks, one 
of smaller diameter than the other. The smaller 
one could be inserted into one end of the other 
to make a single, longer stick. With the longer 
stick Sultan would be equipped to fetch a 
banana placed tantalizingly near the bars of 
the cage. But as Sultan himself determined by 
trial neither short stick, by itself, was long 
enough to reach the banana.8 
Matthews goes on to describe the process whereby 
Sultan learns that he can reach the banana by placing 
the sticks together. He then contends, plausibly, that 
Sultan's behavior is best explained by attributing the 
following thoughts to Sultan: "The two sticks can be 
put together to form a single stick" and "the double 
stick can be used to reach the banana." 
There are other impressive examples that strongly 
invite explication in terms ofcreatures having attitudes 
about the attitudes ofother creatures. Dennett describes 
the case of vervet monkeys who give a peculiar cry 
that functions to warn others in the group of an 
approaching leopard: 
...one band of vervets was losing ground in a 
territorial skirmish with another band. One of 
the losing-side monkeys, temporarily out of 
the fray, seemed to get a bright idea: it 
suddenly issued a leopard alarm (in the 
absence of any leopards), leading all the 
vervets to take up the cry and head for the 
trees-creating a truce and regaining the 
ground his side had been losing.9 
This sort of evidence is, to be sure, anecdotal. But it 
does strongly suggest that there are other grounds for 
thought-even of fairly high order-than linguistic 
competence. The vervet, like Sultan, engages in 
behavior too complex not to be characterized in terms 
of thought. Now, Malcolm's position could, nonetheless 
be defended against such examples by simply insisting 
that such cases credit animals with more than is 
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necessary. After all, for Malcolm, the connection 
between thought and language is logical, not evidential. 
But such an obstinate refusal to attribute thoughts to 
Arthur, Sultan, or Dennett's vervets on such grounds 
would seem to amount to the bare stipulation that 
connects thought to language. 
III 
Despite its difficulties, Malcolm's position is really 
quite moderate on the issue of animal minds. Like 
Wittgenstein, Malcolm allows for a fairly rich animal 
psychology, even if he refuses to attribute thoughts to 
them. Some, like Davidson, Frey, and Stich, have 
followed a similar line of reasoning to the conclusion 
that animals cannot be credited with having any 
intentional states at all. While these views deserve 
careful consideration, I will not examine them now. I 
would like to comment briefly on part of Stich's position 
on animal belief, though, because I think there is a 
Wittgensteinian response to it. lO 
Stich's contention has to do with the difficulty of 
identifying the specific content of alleged animal belief. 
The central argument is this. We can attribute beliefs to 
a creature only if we can specify the contents of the 
beliefs attributed. But if a creature lacks language, we 
cannot specify its belief-contents. So, we cannot 
attribute belief to creatures without language. Stich 
argues that we cannot specify a belief-content for any 
animal belief, and unless we can specify belief-content, 
it is not clear in what sense we can explain animal 
behavior by appealing to their beliefs. "It is absurd to 
suggest that we can explain an animal's behavior in 
tenns of beliefs and desires when we cannot say what 
it is that the animal believes."" An animal like Malcolm's 
dog cannot have the concept "oak tree" or for that matter 
"cat." But if not, it is not clear what it is to attribute l1le 
belief that the cat is up the oak tree to the dog. 
This difficulty involving the content of animal belief 
is only apparent. It can be removed as long as we don't 
assume that the specific content of animal beliefs must 
be identical to those oflinguistically competent humans, 
as Richard Jeffrey has suggested: 
Butcan one agree that the dog simply doesn't 
have our concept of a tree without concluding 
that the dog has no concept that we can 
characterize (say, as 'marker a scratcher can 
disappear up') that applies relevantly to that 
50 Winter & Spring 1996 
Wittgenstein andAnimal Minds 
tree and that cat. I don't see why we can't  
deploy a terminology apt for characterizing 
those of the dog's beliefs and desires that 
concern us without falling into the trap of using 
terms that would only be apt for people.12 
The differences in canine and human concepts are due 
to our different "forms of life;" nevertheless, our 
concepts overlap in many ways. We could adopt 
something along the lines of Wittgenstein's notion of 
"family resemblances"13 and thus replace the notion a 
particular conceptp with a family ofp-related concepts. 
The cat chasing dog's concept of the tree is not identical 
to our concept, but it is related to our concept and can 
pick out the same object in the world. 
IV 
Denying animal mentality has had obvious tragic moral 
implications for animals. But what of the more moderate 
limitations proposed (albeit unsuccessfully) by 
Wittgenstein and Malcolm? In a recent paper, William 
Hyde, arguing in an explicitly Wittgensteinian spirit, 
contended that the appropriate way to understand the 
context for being able to ascribe complex mental states 
to individuals is in terms of "stories."14 He suggests 
that we think ofmental states, or at least complex mental 
states, as story-states. Rather than conceiving of our 
mental concepts as referring to innerbrain ormind-states, 
we are to understand them in relation to stories that 
connect the concepts to other concepts. Only by locating 
our mental concepts in the appropriate story context 
can we understand them to be mental states at all. 
Hyde draws the following consequences for the 
possibility ofanimal rights. To have rights, a being must 
have complex mental states. To have complex mental 
states means having complex story states, and animals 
don't have complex story-states. So, they don't have 
rights. Without stories, no animal can count as "one of 
us." Thus, on Hyde's view, animals may have moral 
standing, but they cannot have rights. He also maintains 
that the very concept of "rights" demands "reciprocity," 
a condition animals cannot meet. 
Where Malcolm excluded animals from the realm 
of thoughts, Hyde excludes them from the realm of 
stories. In either case, they don't have rights. I suppose 
that in allowing for animal concepts, I am allowing for 
animal stories, if I may use that term. Many animals 
are, as Tom Regan puts it, subjects-of-a-life; that is, 
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they have beliefs, desires, perceptions, memory, a sense 
of the future, goals, and most importantly, a welfare. A 
dog may not believe its master will arrive the day after 
tomorrow, but that's just to say that there are some 
human stories that it doesn't participate in. According 
to Richard Routley, from a canine perspective, there 
are as many smells as there are things in the world.15 
Can't we say that from the dog's perspective, every 
smell tells a story? The human olfactory awareness is 
comparatively impoverished. So, there are many 
canine "stories" that we don't participate in. But, I 
want to claim, what is more significant is that there are 
shared stories, in an admittedly broad sense, between 
humans and animals. 
Perhaps it is too odd to describe the conceptual life 
of infralinguistic creatures in terms of stories. Stories 
do provide context, but context can be provided 
without, or at least prior to, stories. Even stories 
require context, as Wittgenstein tries to demonstrate 
in the Investigations, when he describes a very 
primitive "builder's language." Part of the point there 
was to show that meaning is to be understood in terms 
of what we do. That is, human practices and activities 
are what give rise to meaning. The only "story" that 
Wittgenstein builders have is given in their activity.16 
The sense of human stories must be understood in 
connection with human activity-with human life 
generally. The priority of human life and activity for 
meaning sheds light on the nature of human morality 
and the role that animals may play in it. 
I don't want to argue about animal rights per se. I 
don't know of anyone who seriously maintains that 
animals have rights in the sense of meeting the 
reciprocity condition. Ofcourse, Regan and others deny 
that moral agency is a necessary condition for having 
rights, thus arguing for rights without reciprocity. And 
here again, one could employ Wittgenstein's family 
traits to argue that our conception of animal rights need 
not include every feature of human rights. But I would 
prefer to avoid the rights quagmire and talk instead 
about the psychological and moral connection between 
humans and animals. Cora Diamond has argued that 
the recognition of human rights has lillie to do with an 
impartial account of which mental states, complex or 
not, other human beings have.17 Rather, the sense of 
moral community with another lies in the recognition 
of one simply as a "fellow human being"-as Prof. 
Hyde might say, "one of us." But Diamond suggests 
similarly viewing animals as "fellow creatures" to 
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whom we extend our pity and our sympathy. I find 
Diamond's view to be attractive. And it is a view very 
much in the Wittgensteinian spirit. I would only add 
that sympathy and pity are appropriate only ifwe share 
something with nonhuman animals. There is a 
psychological connection here that gives the sympathy 
and pity their point 18 To recognize an animal in this 
way as a "fellow creature" is to that extent to see it as 
"one of us." The lines between the species simply cannot 
be sharply drawn. 
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